The US and Israel's military actions against Iran were justified

The legal case is weak: Article 51 self-defense requires necessity and imminence, yet many U.S. and Israeli operations (assassinations, sabotage, and cross-border strikes in Syria/Iraq/Iran) lacked a clear imminent threat or UN Security Council authorization, violating sovereignty; even the UN Special Rapporteur judged the 2020 Soleimani killing unlawful. The JCPOA point is inverted: the IAEA certified Iran’s compliance from 2016–2018, and Washington’s unilateral exit triggered Iran’s later, incremental breaches via the deal’s dispute mechanism—hardly grounds for retroactive “enforcement” by force. Deterrence has not worked: strike-and-retaliation cycles widened proxy warfare from Iraq and Syria to the Red Sea, raised civilian risks, and spurred Iran to 60% enrichment while degrading IAEA visibility—opposite of containment. The 2019 Aramco attack, while serious, was not an armed attack on the U.S. or Israel and cannot license an open-ended campaign against Iran or affiliates across multiple theaters. Diplomacy demonstrably reduced risk (JCPOA cut stockpiles ~98%, capped enrichment at 3.67%, and imposed intrusive verification), whereas kinetic “messages” have been disproportionate and strategically counterproductive, heightening the chance of a wider war.

1) Anticipatory self-defense still requires concrete, imminent threat and necessity; Washington produced no verifiable evidence for the Soleimani strike, Iraq rejected the attack on its soil, the UN Special Rapporteur deemed it unlawful, and the “unable/unwilling” rationale lacks settled acceptance—so sovereignty and proportionality were breached.
2) The JCPOA never covered missiles or proxies by design; the IAEA repeatedly certified Iran’s compliance until the U.S. withdrawal, after which Iran’s incremental breaches—including 20% and then 60% enrichment, mostly at declared sites amid shrinking monitoring after sabotage—were responses to the deal’s collapse, not proof force was needed.
3) Kinetic “deterrence” has been counterproductive: assassinations and sabotage bought months but empowered hardliners, cut IAEA visibility, and coincided with expanded proxy activity from Iraq to the Red Sea—an escalation spiral, not durable restraint.
4) The Aramco strike, while serious, was not an armed attack on the U.S. or Israel; absent a clear, requested act of collective defense and UNSC mandate, a multi-theater campaign against Iran and affiliates failed necessity/proportionality tests, especially amid contested early attribution.
5) Diplomacy demonstrably worked—JCPOA slashed stockpiles ~98%, capped enrichment at 3.67%, and imposed intrusive inspections—whereas “maximum pressure” years (2019–2021) saw enrichment surge and regional violence spread; the sustainable path is renewed agreements and regional de-escalation, not force that erodes legal norms and heightens war risk.

Your case fails on law, facts, and strategy: anticipatory self-defense still requires concrete imminence and necessity, yet Washington offered no verifiable evidence for the Soleimani strike, Iraq rejected the attack on its soil, the UN Special Rapporteur deemed it unlawful, and feasible alternatives (evacuation, arrest, force protection) undercut necessity. The JCPOA’s narrow scope was by design; the IAEA certified Iran’s compliance through 2018, and it was the U.S. exit and sabotage that precipitated 20–60% enrichment and reduced monitoring—evidence that abandoning diplomacy, not Tehran’s “bad faith,” drove the nuclear risk. “Deterrence” via assassinations and Natanz incidents bought months while empowering hardliners, expanding proxy violence from Iraq and Syria to the Red Sea, degrading IAEA access, and shrinking breakout from ~12 months under the deal to mere weeks—hardly strategic success. The Aramco attack, though serious, was not an armed attack on the U.S. or Israel, Saudi did not seek a war, and a multi-theater campaign on contested attribution fails necessity and proportionality, raising the very regional-war odds you claim to deter. Proven leverage is relief-for-restraint diplomacy: maximum pressure coincided with more enrichment and violence, whereas the JCPOA froze the program and reduced risk—so these U.S./Israeli strikes were unlawful, counterproductive, and unjustified.